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The Selection of Party Leaders in Northern Ireland 
 
This article provides an analysis of the leadership selection methods adopted 
by Northern Ireland’s five main parties. Drawing on data from interviews with 
party elites and internal party documents, it sheds light on an important 
element of intra-party organisation in the region and constitutes a rare case-
study of leadership selection in a consociational democracy. By accounting for 
instances of organisational reform this article also reveals the extent to which 
Northern Ireland’s parties align with the wider comparative trend of leadership 
‘democratisation’. In terms of ‘who’ selects party leaders, the analysis finds a 
substantial degree of organisational heterogeneity and a reasonably high rate of 
democratisation. Northern Ireland’s parties also prove rather exceptional in 
their universal adoption of short fixed terms for party leaders and, in the case 
of three of the parties, their preference for high candidacy thresholds.  
 
Keywords: Democratisation, Intra-party democracy, Leadership selection, Northern Ireland, 
Party organisation, Power-sharing. 
 
 
Leadership selection is widely regarded as one of the defining functions of a political party in 
a representative democracy (Gunther and Diamond, 2001). As a result, it is an area of 
decision-making with considerable significance at several levels. How parties select their 
leaders can, for instance, tell us a great deal about how they approach the issue of intra-party 
democracy, acting as a lens through which we can view the existing balance of power within 
a party as a political system (LeDuc, 2001; Cross, 2013). ‘Who is empowered to participate 
in leadership selection’, as Cross and Blais (2012: 9) explain, ‘speaks directly to the issue of 
where power lies in [a] party’. 
The process of leadership selection also has significance beyond any consideration of 
parties’ internal democratic priorities and ethos. On account of parties’ enduring position at 
the centre of representative democracy (Dalton et al. 2011), scholars are compelled to 
examine how those who lead these integral institutions are selected. More specifically, a 
party’s choice of leader often has direct consequences for the identity and background of 
those who lead countries at a national level – be it in government or parliament (Cross and 
Pilet, 2014: 5). The ramifications of the choice of party selectorates can, therefore, extend 
beyond the intra-party realm to include the not insignificant matter of who acts as the head of 
government.  
 Party leaders in modern democracies have also become especially dominant figures 
over the past two decades, as their influence on intra-party and system-level decision-making 
has increased substantially (McAllister, 1996; Aaarts et al. 2011; Katz and Mair, 1994). 
Identifying clear growth in the authority of party leaders across several areas – including 
government formation, portfolio allocation, campaigning and the formulation of policy – 
commentators refer to the ‘presidentialization’ of party politics in parliamentary democracies 
with increasing confidence (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). This trend of party leaders as 
increasingly powerful figures is observable in all party systems, both majoritarian and 
consensus (Cross and Blais, 2012). Given such power, ‘the methods through which party 
leaders achieve their position are important political institutions’ (Kenig, 2009b: 240). 
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 The past three decades have seen party scholars analyse leadership selection in a 
considerable array of cases. More recent years have seen several comparative studies of the 
topic (see Cross and Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014). Collectively, such research has 
improved our understanding of what has long been an under-examined area (Cross and Blais, 
2012: 3-5). One region which has escaped such newfound interest and scrutiny, however, is 
that of Northern Ireland. Despite the general importance of the topic and Northern Ireland’s 
reputation as arguably ‘the most heavily researched area on earth’ (Whyte, 1990: vii), 
negligible attention has been paid to how its party leaders are selected. This is indicative of a 
general scarcity of research on intra-party democracy in Northern Ireland. Tonge and Evans 
(2002: 60) have highlighted the ‘dearth of information concerning political parties in 
Northern Ireland’, stating in an earlier study the need to address the ‘lack of information 
concerning political parties’ in the region (Evans and Tonge, 2001: 104). It also stands in 
stark contrast to the number of investigations of the leadership selection methods (and 
dynamics) of parties in both Britain and Ireland (see Marsh, 1993; Rafter, 2003; Cross and 
Blais, 2012; Alderman, 1999; Punnett, 1993; Stark, 1996; Quinn, 2005; Bale and Webb, 
2014). The interest of party scholars in these two neighbouring jurisdictions has not led to an 
in-depth examination of the methods adopted by Northern Ireland’s main parties. 
 To address this paucity of research, this study provides an empirical analysis of 
leadership selection in Northern Ireland. Drawing on data from 41 semi-structured interviews 
with party elites and historical party documents, it sheds light on an important element of 
intra-party organisation in the region, offering a rare insight into the democratic character of 
its main parties. As a consociational democracy Northern Ireland also constitutes a highly 
novel case-study of leadership selection. The most wide-ranging comparative study of the 
topic to date, for example, includes just one consociational democracy, Belgium (see Pilet 
and Cross, 2014). Indeed, the lack of interest in leadership selection in Northern Ireland is 
especially puzzling when we consider the central role afforded to and played by political 
leaders in the region. Consociational democracy is predicated upon accommodation among 
elites of competing groups within society. Party leaders, as the ‘elites’ in question, are 
therefore integral to the effective functioning of the system (to say nothing of its 
establishment) (Lijphart, 1977; Coakley, 2011). By definition then, power-sharing affords a 
greater number of party leaders with executive influence than is the case in other institutional 
settings. This sharing of power, therefore, serves to magnify the importance of understanding 
how each of these leaders gets elected to serve in the inclusive ‘elite cartel’ (Lijphart, 1969: 
213). Furthermore, with the exception of Sinn Féin1, party leaders in Northern Ireland are 
also the ‘chief nominating officers’ for the formation of a power-sharing executive; meaning 
that when selecting a leader parties are also influencing the composition of a much larger 
regional leadership grouping. The sheer amount of leaders with viable political decision-
making influence in the Northern Ireland case, therefore, lends a study of leadership selection 
in the region added significance.  
 In addition to providing a systematic comparative analysis of leadership selection in 
Northern Ireland – highlighting significant differences in the methods of the main parties – 
this study is longitudinal. This enables us to ascertain the degree to which the parties’ 
procedures have changed over their respective lifetimes. One contemporary trend concerning 
party organisation is the ‘democratisation’ of leadership selection procedures (Caul-Kittilson 
                                                          
1 By Sinn Féin we mean Provisional Sinn Féin which was formed as a result of a split in the Irish republican 
movement in 1970. This is the Sinn Féin referred to hereafter. 
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and Scarrow, 2003). While not a universal phenomenon, an increasing number of parties have 
widened the franchise in leadership elections in recent decades; replacing selection by an 
exclusive group of party elites (usually a parliamentary caucus) with either a delegate 
convention or closed party primary (Kenig, 2009b; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Blais, 
2012; LeDuc, 2001). Grassroots members are, therefore, being granted (at least in a formal 
sense) greater direct decision-making authority regards leadership choice. With particular 
relevance to Northern Ireland, this ‘participatory revolution’ (Punnett, 1993: 272) has taken 
hold in the British and Irish party systems, where the majority of parties have made moves in 
recent decades to provide members a role in leadership election (Seyd, 1999; Bale and Webb, 
2014; Farrell, 1994; Denham, 2012; Cross and Blais, 2012; Kenig, 2009).  By accounting for 
instances of organisational change this study reveals and assesses the extent to which 
Northern Ireland’s parties align with such a trend.  
 The paper is divided into four sections. Firstly, the analytical framework is briefly 
outlined. Attention then turns to answering the important question of ‘who is the party 
leader?’ in the Northern Irish case. Following this, a detailed analysis of each of the main 
parties’ leadership selection procedures is provided, documenting any instances of 
organisational reform. A concluding section then summarises key findings, focusing on those 
features of the parties’ processes which are most noteworthy from a comparative perspective 
and the extent of ‘democratisation’ which has occurred in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
1. Analytical framework  
 
In respect of intra-party elections, British and Irish law treats political parties as private 
organisations. As a result, there are no significant legal regulations concerning leadership 
selection in Northern Ireland with parties free to adopt any method they deem suited to the 
task. Given such potential idiosyncrasy this study utilises the analytical framework developed 
by Kenig (2009a) and adopted in other comparative studies of leadership selection (Cross and 
Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014) to make sense of the parties’ selection methods. We 
analyse three key features when classifying Northern Ireland’s parties’ leadership selection 
methods: the selectorate; candidacy requirements; and deselection mechanism. Figure 1. 
provides a summary of the range of options available to parties for each of these three 
categories. As indicated, the options can be scaled according to an inclusivity continuum. For 
example, a selectorate composed of party members is a more inclusive body than one 
consisting of parliamentarians. Likewise, a process which allows every citizen to seek 
selection as leader is a more inclusive form of candidacy than that which is restricted to party 
members. In terms of deselection, a party which provides for a ‘no-confidence vote’ boasts a 
more inclusive process than a party which does not specify any formal mechanism for 
removing an incumbent. 
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 Selectorate Candidacy Deselection Mechanism 
 
Inclusive  
 Voters Every citizen, No-Confidence Vote 
  no additional requirements 
 
 Party members  Every citizen, Leadership Review 
 with additional requirements 
 
 Delegates to a  Party members, Direct challenge at the 
 party convention no additional requirements end of a (short) fixed  
   term 
 
 Parliamentary  Party members, 
 party group with additional requirements 
   Direct challenge at the 
 Party council Parliamentarians, no end of a (long) fixed 
  additional requirements term 
 
 Single leader Parliamentarians, with  No formal mechanism  
 additional requirements for de-selecting a leader 
 
Exclusive 
 
Figure 1 Party leader selection methods: a three dimensional classification 
  
 
 
 
 
2. Who is the party leader? 
 
Unlike in some cases (Pilet and Cross, 2014: 224-226), leaders are easily identified in 
Northern Ireland. With the exception of Sinn Féin, the main parties subscribe to the typical 
Westminster model, concentrating leadership authority into the hands of one person, 
accounting for a ‘party leader’ in their formal rules and granting them substantial executive 
powers.2 Similar to the main British and Irish parties, the DUP, UUP, SDLP and Alliance 
provide for a single leader of the party both within and outside of parliament. Formally 
several positions of leadership may be maintained (e.g. a party Chairman or President) but 
these are not considered direct (or powerful) extra-parliamentary rivals to the party leader. 
Consociational democracy of course brings its own complexity to the common link between 
party leadership and premiership, with power shared among several parties. However, most 
party leaders, if eligible, have assumed the highest executive role afforded to them in 
                                                          
2 DUP (2013) The Constitution and Rules of the Democratic Unionist Party; UUP (2007) The Constitution, Rules 
and Standing Orders of the Ulster Unionist Party; SDLP (2012) Social Democratic and Labour Party Constitution; 
APNI (2013) Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Constitution and Rules 
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Northern Ireland. Past exceptions to this rule have been the SDLP with John Hume (1998-
2001) and Sinn Féin with Gerry Adams (2007-10). 
 The one exception to the generally unambiguous nature of party leadership in 
Northern Ireland is Sinn Féin. The ‘President’ of Sinn Féin has no formal executive powers 
within the party and is a co-equal member of a national leadership team (see below). As 
highlighted, Sinn Féin has also severed the common link between party leadership and 
premiership. There are several plausible explanations for this. A common feature of parties 
associated with socialist or revolutionary movements is a subscription to an ethos of 
‘collective leadership’ and a reluctance to grant their parliamentary party a privileged 
position (Aaarts et al. 2011: 113). To ensure unity of purpose Sinn Féin delegates 
responsibility to a phalanx of prominent ‘leaders’ within the republican movement, thereby 
avoiding accusations of oligarchy. The exceptional nature of ‘party leadership’ in Sinn Féin is 
also likely explained by the fact that, as a self-proclaimed all-Ireland entity, it represents a 
rare case of a political party operating in two separate jurisdictions: the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland. In the pursuit of electoral representation in both states Sinn Féin has 
adopted a twin-track (and amorphous) approach to party leadership, with Gerry Adams acting 
as the party’s chief figurehead in Dáil Éireann and Martin McGuinness performing a 
prominent leadership role in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.3 Nonetheless, 
while formally speaking we may not be able to identify a leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams is 
widely regarded as the undisputed leader of the party. 
  
 
3.1. Democratic Unionist Party  
 
Leadership selection in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the preserve of its 
parliamentary party group, which includes those members of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, European Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly.4 The choice of the 
parliamentary party is subject to ratification by a Central Executive Committee (CEC); 
however, this second stage of the process can be (dis)regarded as a formal ‘rubber-
stamping’.5  
 In terms of its selectorate the DUP would, therefore, be positioned at the more 
exclusive or closed end of our inclusivity continuum. The power of selection rests in the 
hands of a small number of elected representatives or the ‘party in public office’ (Katz and 
Mair, 2002) (see Figure 1.1). Prior to a rule change in 2013 this grouping was smaller still, 
with only Assembly members afforded selection rights. The broadening of the selectorate to 
include MEPs and MPs, however, represents a formal acknowledgement of previous practice. 
Accounts from the sole DUP leadership change in 2008 (with Peter Robinson replacing Ian 
Paisley) suggest considerable informal involvement of the party’s MPs in the process 
(Gordon, 2009). DUP interviewees also explained how the party’s MPs played a key role in 
the decision-making process in 2008, offering ‘advice, guidance and support’ to the party’s 
                                                          
3 Adams was elected as a TD in 2011. 
4 DUP (2013) The Constitution and Rules of the Democratic Unionist Party 
5 At present, the CEC is comprised of delegates elected from constituency associations, university associations, 
and the Young Democratic Unionist Council; the party leader and deputy party leader; and those members 
who are an MP, MLA, MP or Peer (DUP, 2013). The voting method used by the DUP’s selectorate is not 
stipulated in party statutes. 
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MLA team.6 Crucially, the change in 2013 does not represent a significant departure from the 
principle of selection by the parliamentary party group (PPG), which the party has been 
wedded to since its formation in 1971.7 That the use of this exclusive selectorate has 
remained steadfast over the party’s lifetime indicates that the DUP has been impervious to the 
trend of democratisation affecting leadership selection procedures in many Western party 
systems, including those in Britain and Ireland. The exclusive nature of selection in the DUP 
is also in keeping with widely-held perceptions of the party’s internal structure and general 
organisational culture, which suggest a centralised and top-down order (see Tonge et al. 
2014).  
Foremost among the rationales offered by those in the DUP for the party’s choice of 
leadership selectorate was that the party’s elected representatives are the most qualified 
members to assess the credentials of leadership contenders. With any future candidate most 
likely to emerge from the party’s Assembly group, Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs) are especially well placed, ‘to make the judgment call’.8 As another DUP official 
explained: ‘It is the MLAs that have to work with the leader, day in, day out. They see the 
qualities and leadership potential more clearly than the ordinary party members’.9 This notion 
of parliamentarians being ‘best suited to judge the relative merits of would-be-leaders’ is 
reasoning provided in other cases where those in ‘the party room’ are solely responsible for 
selection (Cross and Blais, 2012: 169; Gauja, 2014: 196).  
 In terms of deselection, the DUP leader is elected annually before 30th April each 
year.10 Formally speaking then, a leader is only in post for a short fixed term, with 
(re)selection a regular occurrence.11 While a leader may face annual selection, candidacy 
requirements in the DUP for the position are of an exclusive nature. Although ordinary party 
members are eligible to stand for selection the width of this pool of aspirants is drastically 
reduced by the need to secure endorsement from two members of the PPG.12 The 
‘gatekeeping’ role performed by the parliamentary party in terms of leadership selection is, 
therefore, almost total. The initiative for a contest rests firmly with the party’s 
parliamentarians and any challenge is likely to emerge from this body or at the very least 
enjoy its support. Notably, the candidacy requirements and deselection mechanism adopted 
by the DUP have remained unchanged over the course of the party’s history.   
 On the prospect of the party adopting a more inclusive selectorate – one involving the 
party grassroots to a greater extent – the majority of those interviewed in the DUP expressed 
their reluctance (if not opposition) to change any aspect of what they regard as an 
organisational structure which has contributed to sustained electoral growth in recent 
decades. This view was perhaps best expressed by one senior party official: ‘I am much more 
                                                          
6 DUP 8 (2013, May) Interview with the author; DUP 2 (2013, April) Interview with the author; DUP 5 (2013, 
April) Interview with the author 
7 DUP (1982) The Constitution and Rules of the Ulster  Democratic Unionist Party; (1996) The Constitution and 
Rules of the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party; (2009) The Constitution and Rules of the Ulster Democratic 
Unionist Party 
8 DUP 6 (2013, May) Interview with the author 
9 DUP 3 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
10 DUP (2013) The Constitution and Rules of the Democratic Unionist Party 
11 The DUP does not formally stipulate how an exceptional meeting of the parliamentary party group can be 
called outside of this annual window. 
12 While not formally outlined in the party rules this requirement was used in the leadership change of 2008 
(Belfast Telegraph, 2008). 
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concerned with what works as opposed to the democratic legitimacy of all of it’.13 Electoral 
success is also offered as an ameliorating factor for the membership in terms of the exclusive 
nature of the leadership process: ‘If the strategy is electorally successful then I suspect 
whatever minor gripes people have are very small in comparison with the success’.14 In 
adopting the model of organisation that it does, the DUP is asking to be judged not on the 
basis of the process but by the outcomes that it achieves. To borrow a phrase from Caul-
Kittilson and Scarrow (2003: 66) the DUP’s ‘test of organizational quality’ is electoral 
success. Such sentiment concurs with other studies of the DUP which highlight its ‘electoral-
professional’ (Panebianco, 1988) credentials (Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty, 2008) and 
supports other more general findings that posit electoral underperformance as one of the main 
contributing factors towards the democratisation of leadership selection methods (Cross and 
Blais, 2012: ch. 3; Pilet and Cross, 2014: 229). Indeed, cold water was consistently poured on 
the prospect of future reform by most of those interviewed in the DUP and there is seemingly 
little in the way of an internal lobby (either at elite or grassroots level) for reform.15 As with 
other instances of party organisational reform, leadership democratisation stems from a 
combination of exogenous and endogenous factors (Harmel, 2002). Put simply, without 
sufficient external pressure, such as an electoral setback, party elites will typically resist 
change and those who advocate change will lack compelling evidence to support their case. 
Equally, however, an internal lobby for reform has to exist if external pressures are to be 
brought to bear on the party organisation. Neither appears to exist to any significant extent in 
the DUP.16 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Ulster Unionist Party 
 
The leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is elected by the party membership – using the 
single transferable vote (STV) – at an annual convention.17 Those entitled to vote must be 
fully paid-up members. While any member of the UUP may seek selection as party leader, a 
candidate must secure the support of a minimum of 35 members from at least nine 
constituency associations. This latter requirement, with candidates requiring support from 
half of the UUP’s existing associations, protects incumbents from cases of arbitrary and 
spontaneous challenge – a scenario which has manifested itself on several occasions in the 
past. The UUP does not set a tenure limit for its leadership; however, the provision for an 
annual contest does constitute a short fixed term. The leader of the UUP could, therefore, face 
regular challenge to their position if a member satisfies the candidacy requirements. 
The UUP’s leadership selection procedures have undergone significant transformation 
over the course of its history, with selection moving from a decision taken by a parliamentary 
                                                          
13 DUP 7 (2013, April) Interview with the author (emphasis in original) 
14 DUP 7 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
15 DUP 9 (2014, May) Interview with the author; DUP 4 (2013, May) Interview with the author; DUP 1 (2013, 
May) Interview with the author 
16 If it so wishes, the party grassroots can initiate constitutional reform. The power to amend the DUP’s 
constitution rests with the party’s CEC which has majority representation for the extra-parliamentary party.   
17 UUP (2007) The Constitution, Rules and Standing Orders of the Ulster Unionist Party 
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party grouping to the current ‘One Member One Vote’ (OMOV) franchise. Indeed, the UUP 
is arguably one of the clearest examples available to party scholars of the contemporary trend 
of leadership selection ‘democratisation’ occurring in Western democracies. Between 1905 
and 1974, leadership selection (and deselection) in the UUP was controlled by the party’s 
parliamentary grouping, essentially taking the form of elite peer-review (notwithstanding 
instances of tokenistic ‘ratification’ by other party agencies). Each of the nine leadership 
changes during this period saw a candidate selected by a small group of parliamentarians 
(Harbinson, 1973; Walker, 2004). From the initial leadership of Edward J. Saunderson (1905-
06) to that of Terence O’Neill (1963-69), a single suitable candidate would be identified by 
the parliamentary caucus and invited to lead the party. The UUP leader, therefore, ‘emerged’ 
from a group of party notables in much the same way as occurred with the British 
Conservative Party prior to 1965  (Young, 1989: 91; Denham, 2009). The informal nature of 
leadership selection in this period also extended to candidacy requirements, with no specific 
provisos outlined in any official statute. There was also a tangible link between the 
confidence of the UUP’s PPG and the security of the leader’s position (Harbinson, 1973; 
Walker, 2004). In summary, leadership selection in the UUP during the period 1905-74 was 
predicated upon elite control. 
 
 
Single Party  Parliamentary  Delegates  Party  Voters 
leader council group to a party members  
  convention 
 
 
 DUP 
 (1971) 
 
 UUP 
   (1905)  (1974) (2007) 
 
    Sinn Féin 
    (1970) 
 
   SDLP 
   (1970)  (1995) 
 
   APNI 
  (1970)  (1998) 
 
 
Figure 2 Inclusiveness of the leadership selectorate in Northern Ireland (1905-2014)  
Source: adapted from Pilet and Cross (2014) 
Note: Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new 
selectorate 
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 Following the suspension of devolution in Northern Ireland in 1972, and with no 
parliamentary party grouping to speak of, the UUP moved to adopt a procedure in 1974 
where the party leader would be elected using an eliminative-vote system at the Annual 
General Meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), a delegate body.18 While ‘an 
unwieldy and complex organisation representative of all classes and all shades of Unionist 
opinion’ (Harbinson, 1973: 59), the largest number of UUC delegates represented the local 
constituency associations. The introduction of a delegate selectorate, therefore, constituted a 
democratisation of leadership selection in the UUP, with the membership granted greater 
influence and a more decisive say in the selection of the party leader. However, the 
involvement of other powerful affiliated bodies in the process meant that the system used by 
the UUP was ‘impure’ (Kenig, 2009a), diminishing the influence of those delegates 
representing the membership.19 Of these bodies the Orange Order was afforded the greatest 
number of delegates and was a body with substantial informal influence that leadership 
candidates actively courted (Jess, 2007).  
With the election of Reg Empey as leader in 2005 the UUP launched a ‘root and 
branch’ review of its internal organisation. This would eventually lead to the introduction of a 
direct member vote for leadership selection in 2007. The UUP’s adoption of ‘OMOV’, a 
wholly leadership-led initiative, has seen it go further than any other party in Northern 
Ireland in terms of democratising its selectorate.20 The UUP’s adoption of OMOV can be 
explained in several ways. Firstly, this reform should be situated within the context of a wider 
program of organisational reform enacted by the party in 2007. This constitutional review had 
three key related aims: shifting authority to the central party leadership from traditionally 
powerful and autonomous local constituency associations; modernising or ‘professionalising’ 
the party’s structures; and fostering a new culture of internal discipline and cohesion.21 As a 
result, several features of the UUP’s organisation were centralised, including the 
administration of party finances and membership registration.22 Perhaps the most notable area 
of centralisation, however, occurred in respect of candidate selection – where a new central 
shortlisting process was introduced and the party leadership was afforded representation on a 
final selectorate. Crucially, above all other explanations, such centralisation informed the 
party’s adoption of party primaries for leadership selection. Democratising leadership 
selection was essentially a quid pro quo for diluting the autonomy of local constituency 
associations in several areas, not least that of candidate selection. Providing members with a 
greater say in the choice of leader effectively sweetened the pill of curbing the autonomy 
jealously guarded by local constituency associations. As one senior UUP official explained:  
 
                                                          
18 Although UUP representation continued in Westminster, those MPs were not considered a powerful enough 
body to maintain control of leadership selection. The real ‘kingmakers’ under the previous PPG procedure 
were those who had held regional office in Northern Ireland, the MPs and Senators in Stormont. 
19 These included the Orange Order, which was granted representation on the UUC up until 2004 when it 
chose to sever its formal link with the UUP; the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council; the Ulster Young Unionist 
Council; the Ulster Unionist Councillor’s Association; and the Ulster Unionist Labour Association. 
20 To place the party in a slightly wider context, the only other main British political parties to afford their party 
members the sole say in leadership contests are the Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party and Plaid 
Cymru; while in Ireland, OMOV is adopted only in the case of the Greens and Fianna Fáil. 
21 UUP 6 (2013, April) Interview with the author; UUP 1 (2013, April) Interview with the author; UUP 7 (2013, 
April) Interview with the author 
22 UUP 3 (2013, March) Interview with the author; UUP 2 (2013, March) Interview with the author 
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[B]ecause we were accruing more power to the centre we felt it only 
right and proper that, in response for members agreeing to that, they 
should be getting something back in return. And, at the end of the day, 
the appointment of a leader is about as important a decision as you can 
get.23 
 
A similar ‘trade-off’ dynamic has been identified in other cases of leadership (and candidate) 
selection reform, not least the British Conservative Party, with which the UUP has 
considerable affinity (Alderman, 1999: 273; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). It is, therefore, unlikely 
that the UUP would have widened its leadership franchise in 2007 if it were not engaged in a 
wider process of organisational reform.  
  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>> 
 
 
Seen in context of a broader bid to centralise power and authority in the party, the 
adoption of OMOV has also served to bolster and protect the position of the UUP leader. 
Those in the party, for instance, referred to the importance of an annual mandate from the 
party membership for the leader’s standing and legitimacy within the party.24 A full 
membership vote is often an important point of reference for a party leader and a useful tool 
with which to dispel potential challengers and silence critics (see Quinn, 2005: 807; Cross 
and Blais, 2012: 179; Katz and Mair, 2002). Current UUP leader, Mike Nesbitt, has, for 
instance, pointed to the 81% share of the vote he achieved in 2011 as a clear endorsement of 
his leadership by the party rank-and-file. In terms of the UUP leader’s job security, the 
concurrent changes to the candidacy requirements are also noteworthy. As outlined, the 
threshold to be met by a challenger – in terms of signatures and spread of support from the 
extra-parliamentary party – was substantially increased in 2007, making it more difficult to 
contest the leadership.  
 The move to OMOV was also presented by several of those in the UUP as a means 
through which the undue influence of certain powerful local elites (or activists) could be 
negated in the process. The process of appointing delegates for leadership conventions in the 
past was often dominated by senior local officials, including the area’s elected 
representatives.25 This particular rationale has been identified in other similar cases of parties 
with traditionally autonomous associations and powerful affiliated bodies adopting OMOV 
(Wauters, 2014). To borrow a term from one such case, the UUP’s move to OMOV elections 
could be viewed as ‘a function of the strategic calculus of the party elite’ to bolster their 
position by reducing the influence of powerful activists at the local level (Lisi, 2010: 145). In 
some respects, therefore, the UUP has moved from a federalised structure, more typical of the 
‘franchise party’ model (Carty, 2004) and where local elites enjoyed substantial influence 
over proceedings, to one which is much more centralised and favourable to an incumbent 
leader. 
                                                          
23 UUP 6 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
24 UUP 8 (2013, May) Interview with the author 
25 UUP 9 (2014, May) Interview with the author; UUP 4 (2013, March) Interview with the author; UUP 6 (2013, 
April) Interview with the author 
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The adoption of OMOV for leadership selection also represented an attempt by the 
UUP to both incentivise its existing membership and attract newcomers to the fold. To quote 
one party report: ‘The core element of our new structure is the Party member’.26 The party 
has suffered drastic membership losses in recent decades, shrinking from 50,000 in the 1970s 
to roughly 2,000 (McAllister and Nelson, 1979: 285; Belfast Telegraph, 2012).27 Notably, the 
UUP does not set a minimum membership period for those comprising its selectorate. As in 
other cases where a direct membership vote is used this could be viewed as a means to 
encourage membership recruitment during a leadership election campaign (see Carty and 
Blake, 1999). The introduction of OMOV as a selective incentive for membership 
recruitment (and organisational invigoration) within the UUP should, therefore, not be 
discounted. 
On a final note, the UUP joins those parties in other cases which have introduced a 
more inclusive leadership selectorate as a result of electoral defeat(s) (Pilet and Cross, 2014; 
Cross and Blais, 2012).28 The losses suffered by the UUP in the 2005 Westminster elections 
and the 2007 Assembly elections were particularly painful for the party and triggered 
widespread introspective reform, including the measures pertaining to leadership selection. 
The changes to leadership selection, which were part of a larger package of organisational 
reform, could, therefore, be viewed as a direct response by the UUP to its electoral malaise 
since the late 1990s. 
 
 
3.3. Sinn Féin 
 
Sinn Féin has no stand-alone constitutional clause specifically governing the selection of a 
party leader per se. Rather, the party leader, known as the party President, is elected as part of 
a 19-strong executive at an annual delegate conference (Ard Fheis).29 This represents long-
standing practice by Sinn Féin. Indeed, analysis of the party’s rules from 1970 to the present 
day reveals that Sinn Féin’s selection procedure has remained remarkably consistent over 
time, with only minimal and inconsequential changes occurring.30 The majority of delegates 
represent local party branches and selection is by secret ballot using STV.31 Any party 
member can contest the Presidency so long as they receive endorsement from one internal 
party body. Given that this can include a local party branch (cumman) – the smallest 
organisational unit in Sinn Féin – the candidacy threshold could be regarded as relatively low 
and, therefore, inclusive. In terms of deselection, the provision of an annual election means 
that a leader can face a possible direct challenge to their position at the end of a short fixed 
                                                          
26 UUP (2007) ‘Ulster Unionist Council Report and financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2007’ 
27 Exact party membership figures are generally not disclosed by the main political parties in Northern Ireland.   
28 The most recent comparative study of leadership selection finds that two-thirds of the 31 parties which 
‘democratized’ their selectorate did so following electoral defeat (Pilet and Cross, 2014: 228-9). 
29 Sinn Féin (2013) Constitution and Rules 
30 Sinn Féin (1970) Constitution and Rules; (1975) Constitution and Rules; (1980) Constitution and Rules; (1986) 
Constitution and Rules; (1990) Constitution and Rules; (1999) Constitution and Rules; (2005) Constitution and 
Rules 
31 This conference consists of: the officers and members of the outgoing Executive; 2 delegates from each 
District and Regional Executive; 2 delegates from each local branch of 20 members or less; 3 delegates from 
each local branch of over 20 members; 2-8 delegates from the party’s youth wing; 2 delegates from a National 
Councillors’ Forum; 1 delegate each from a ‘Six-County’ and ’26-County’ Parliamentary Group. Sinn Féin 
affords no delegate representation to any affiliated associations or external agencies. 
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term. Despite proposals brought forward by local party branches in 1981 and 1984 for a 
maximum three-year leadership term, there is no time limit placed on a leader’s stay in 
office.32 Opportunity also exists outside the annual window stipulated for a leadership 
challenge. An extraordinary conference can be summoned at any point; although the 
threshold for such an event is high, requiring support from either two-thirds of the party 
executive or one-third of all local branches of six months standing. 
 In some respects, Sinn Féin is remarkable in that it has not initiated any 
‘democratisation’ of its leadership selection process. Of course, this is due in large part to the 
fact that, unlike most parties in Western parliamentary democracies, Sinn Féin has never seen 
the process governed by a grouping of elected representatives. As previously mentioned Sinn 
Féin has long rejected the notion of ‘parliamentarianism’ (or ‘institutionalisation’) and so 
does not afford its elected representatives a privileged position within the party structure.  
While a founding principle of Irish republicanism, the party’s policy of abstentionism – a 
position formally abandoned for elections to Dáil Éireann in 1986 but maintained at 
Westminster – is also reflective of this general reluctance to see power concentrated in the 
hands of its parliamentary party at the expense of the wider organisation (Maillot, 2005: 90). 
The party has, therefore, always adopted one of the two most inclusive (and increasingly 
common) methods for leadership selection: the delegate assembly.33  
 Using leadership selection as a conduit for understanding the internal distribution of 
power within Sinn Féin is a difficult task. On one hand we are presented with a process 
which, on paper at least, is relatively inclusive and contains few barriers for challengers to 
overcome. The party President is not explicitly insulated from challenge and faces annual re-
election. The means, therefore, almost certainly exist for leadership change. As one senior 
official stressed, ‘there are no long-term guarantees built in; it is an annual process of 
renewal’.34 Despite this, however, the party has experienced just one leadership change (itself 
uncontested) since 1970, with Gerry Adams retaining the position of President (without 
challenge) for the past 33 years. Indeed, with Adams’ lengthy tenure in mind, some might 
regard any analysis of leadership selection (and deselection) in Sinn Féin as something of an 
irrelevance or misnomer. What we are able to suggest, however, is that the remarkable 
security of Adams’ position is not on account of any exceptional and exclusionary structural 
incentives built into Sinn Féin’s formal process for selecting its leader. Rather, those seeking 
to understand the nature of Adams’ tenure – as argued by the vast majority of those 
interviewed in Sinn Féin – would be better served focusing on his status as virtual party 
founder and the sustained electoral success experienced during his time as leader. Sinn Féin’s 
transformation from political pariah (and organisational weakling) to the largest nationalist 
party in Northern Ireland and emerging electoral force in the Republic of Ireland is indelibly 
linked with Adams’ leadership (Frampton, 2009). To quote one Sinn Féin interviewee: 
‘People outside of Sinn Féin don’t get it. Republicans have a huge admiration for Gerry’s 
leadership and the way that he has essentially built a political party from nothing’. 
Another possible explanation for Adams’ lengthy tenure is the style of leadership 
subscribed to by Sinn Féin. The party leader, as highlighted, is selected as part of a wider 
‘national leadership team’ and is afforded no special executive powers. As a result, the term 
‘collective leadership’ is often applied to the party, by both commentators and Sinn Féin 
                                                          
32 Sinn Féin (1981) Sinn Féin  Ard Fheis Clár; (1984) Sinn Féin  Ard Fheis Clár 
33 A similar dynamic concerning leadership selection has been identified in the Hungarian case, where the 
starting point for most of the political parties – many of which are modelled on a ‘socialist’ basis – was not a 
closed party council or PPG but a delegate convention (Ilonszki and Varnagy, 2014). 
34 Sinn Féin 1 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
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members alike (see Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 51-2; Maillot, 2005). Those interviewed from 
Sinn Féin made repeated reference to this division of leadership labour. On this point, Sinn 
Féin adopts a feature found in parties of similar origins and purpose, namely west European 
socialist and communist parties. Several parties which have emerged from revolutionary 
movements, such as the African National Congress, also subscribe to a similar mode of 
organisation. In addition to this organisational imperative, Adams has demonstrated an acute 
awareness of the need to delegate responsibility to a large and diverse cadre of ‘leaders’ from 
the commencement of his presidency, thus providing a ready defence against accusations of 
oligarchy while also ensuring influence over all factions of the party (Frampton, 2009; 
English, 2003). The most powerful of these figures, particularly with respect to the more 
militant circles within the republican movement, has been Martin McGuinness, a close ally of 
Adams. Gormley-Heenan’s (2007: 53) study of political leadership during the Northern 
Ireland peace process observed how this spread of decision-making served to safeguard 
Adams’ position: ‘More than anything, it seems that collective leadership is protective in 
nature, since it is difficult to pinpoint and isolate any individual for criticism’ (see Bean, 2007 
for a similar interpretation). It is distinctly possible that ‘collective leadership’ serves a 
similar purpose for Adams (and the party) today as it did during the high-stakes negotiations 
of the 1990s.  
 
3.4. Social Democratic and Labour Party 
 
The leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is elected at an annual 
delegate conference.35 The majority of delegates on this selecting body represent local 
branches and the party enjoys no formal links with any auxiliary associations.36 Selection is 
by secret ballot using STV. Those eligible to contest the leadership must be members of the 
SDLP ‘Assembly or Parliamentary Group’ and must be nominated by at least five branches 
of the party. The candidacy requirements adopted by the SDLP for leadership selection are, 
therefore, highly exclusive. In terms of deselection, the party does not set a maximum tenure 
limit for leadership and the provision of an annual election means that an incumbent is 
elected on a short fixed term. An extraordinary conference may be held if the SDLP 
Executive Committee so decides or if more than ten local branches request one be convened.  
 The SDLP’s leadership selectorate has become more inclusive over time. The 
delegate franchise was introduced in 1995 following 25 years of selection by the SDLP 
parliamentary party.37 In the two leadership changes which occurred in the period 1971-95 
the influence of the parliamentary party in the process can be clearly observed (see Farren, 
2010; Murray, 1998). The first SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt, was elected unanimously by a small 
cabal, namely his fellow party co-founders (all of whom possessed an electoral mandate) 
(Farren, 2010: 31). Following Fitt’s departure from the party in 1979, John Hume was elected 
leader by a small cohort of parliamentarians (Farren, 2010: 155). Leadership selection in the 
SDLP was, therefore, exclusive in nature; no role was afforded to the party membership and 
those eligible for the position would have had to emerge from the party in public office.  
                                                          
35 SDLP (2012) 
36 This conference consists of: delegates appointed by each branch on a scale according to their membership (2 
delegates for a branch of 10-20 members and an additional delegate for every 10 members thereafter); 20 
members of the outgoing Executive committee; the Party President; all SDLP elected representatives; two 
delegates each from the party’s youth wing, women’s group and other ‘support groups’. 
37 SDLP (1971) Social Democratic and Labour Party Constitution; (1995) Social Democratic and Labour Party 
Constitution 
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 Another notable feature of the SDLP’s early leadership selection practice was that 
rules and procedures governing the process were non-existent and seemingly not considered a 
priority. Indeed from 1971 to 1985 there was no formal statutory reference made to the 
position of ‘party leader’ within the SDLP. Conference agenda from the 1970s and 1980s 
reveal sustained agitation by party members to introduce a more transparent and inclusive 
form of selection. In 1977 a motion calling for the party leadership to be chosen according to 
OMOV was defeated.38 Between Hume’s election as leader in 1979 and 1984 a series of 
motions also called for a widening of the franchise. A number of options were proposed, 
including an Electoral College system39; election by a delegate conference every four years40; 
election by members of a ‘Constituency Representatives Group’41; and election at an annual 
delegate conference.42 There was, therefore, a clear drive from sections of the SDLP 
grassroots to be given a say in the selection of the party leader – albeit John Hume was a 
popular incumbent. This drive was met, however, by a central party leadership determined to 
ensure that selection remained under the control of the parliamentary party.43 Eventually, in 
1985 the SDLP endorsed a clause (proposed by the Executive Committee) outlining a process 
for the election of a party leader.44 Incidentally, this was the first formal reference to the 
position of party leader in the SDLP’s history, nearly 15 years after its formation. While this 
new procedure brought greater transparency to the process it did not result in a more 
inclusive mode of selection as the clause simply formalised the existing practice of selection 
by the parliamentary party. The chief selectorate was a newly-formed ‘Constituency 
Representatives Group’ (CRG), comprising the party’s elected representatives at both 
Westminster or in a functioning Northern Ireland Assembly.45 In a nod towards some degree 
of ‘democratisation’ and involvement of the wider party, the PPG’s selection was to be 
ratified by delegates at the subsequent Annual Conference. The new statute also confirmed 
that only members of the CRG were eligible for nomination, which ensured that the pool of 
potential leadership challengers was a shallow one. The likelihood of a ‘stalking horse’ 
candidate emerging under such a system was, therefore, greatly reduced. Furthermore, the 
regularity of selection was also left open-ended with no determined date. In effect, the 
position of party leader in the SDLP was a highly secure one.   
Although never used in practice, the procedures agreed in 1985 would remain 
unchanged until 1995, meaning that for 25 years leadership selection in the SDLP was a 
highly exclusive process and the sole preserve of its parliamentary party. Candidacy was 
restricted to a small group of elected representatives who in turn comprised the only 
meaningful selectorate. Studies of the SDLP’s organisation in this period have identified a 
more general top-down order in the party.  McAllister’s (1977: 45) analysis of the party in its 
formative years highlighted the ‘oligarchic control’ exercised by the party’s elected 
representatives over internal affairs. Mitchell (1991) also deduced that the SDLP 
                                                          
38 SDLP (1977) SDLP, 7th Annual Conference: Agenda and Other Reports 
39 SDLP (1980) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and Other Reports; (1983) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda 
and Other Reports; (1984) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and Other Reports; (1985) SDLP, Annual 
Conference: Agenda and Other Reports 
40 SDLP (1981) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and  Other Reports 
41 SDLP (1983) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and  Other Reports 
42 SDLP (1984) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and  Other Reports 
43 SDLP (1983) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and  Other Reports 
44 SDLP (1985) SDLP, Annual Conference: Agenda and  Other Reports 
45 SDLP (1985) Social Democratic and Labour Party Constitution 
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parliamentary party exercised significant power vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary party. 
Neither of these studies explicitly addressed the issue of leadership selection. However, our 
analysis of this process adds support to their general thesis: power and authority was 
centralised, with the most important actors being the party leader and senior elected 
representatives. 
 Following a special conference convened in 1995 to consider several of the party’s 
organisational features the SDLP introduced the form of selection it uses today: an annual 
delegate conference.46 This change, proposed by the party centre and endorsed by the wider 
membership, was primarily motivated by recent moves by parties in other cases, not least 
Britain and Ireland, to adopt more inclusive modes of selection for leadership.47 As one 
SDLP respondent, closely involved in the implementation of this reform, explained, ‘we were 
following the herd’.48 Another senior party official remarked how the adoption of a more 
inclusive selectorate seemed ‘the natural thing to do at the time’.49 Given the popularity of the 
incumbent John Hume and the absence of serious electoral competition in Northern Ireland at 
the time this seems a valid (if arbitrary) explanation. Another system-level factor was also 
identified by those in the SDLP, as ‘the more settled times’ of the mid-1990s – with an IRA 
ceasefire and the prospect of peace in Northern Ireland – facilitated a period of (overdue) 
reflection on the party’s organisational structures.50 It would be fair to say that the procedures 
used for leadership selection were not a priority for the party throughout much of its early 
history. 
The move to adopt a delegate system represented a clear extension of the leadership 
selection franchise, placing the SDLP alongside several other Western parties which have 
adopted more inclusive procedures in the past two decades. To view 1995 as a watershed 
moment in terms of a ‘democratisation’ of leadership selection or the emancipation of the 
SDLP’s extra-parliamentary party is, however, ill-advised. Crucially, the changes to the 
process did not include a widening of the pool of potential leadership candidates, with 
candidacy restricted to the party’s representatives in Westminster or the Assembly. 
Regardless of the SDLP’s adoption of an annual delegate conference for leadership selection 
it is still, therefore, the party’s elected representatives which play the most important role in 
deselecting a leader.51  
 
 
3.5. Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
 
The Alliance Party selects its leader at an annual delegate conference (see Table 4.1). The 
majority of delegates on this selectorate, known as ‘The Council’, represent local 
                                                          
46 SDLP (1995) Social Democratic and Labour Party Constitution 
47 SDLP 7 (2013, March) Interview with author; SDLP 5 (2013, April) Interview with author; SDLP 2 (2013, 
March) Interview with the author 
48 SDLP 6 (2013, March) Interview with the author 
49 SDLP 3 (2013, March) Interview with the author 
50 SDLP 1 (2013, March) Interview with the author; SDLP 4 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
51 The SDLP parliamentary party was actively involved in the party’s most recent leadership change. Margaret 
Ritchie resigned in the face of criticism from her parliamentary peers over the party’s poor performance in the 
2011 NI Assembly and local government elections.  
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constituency associations.52 Those eligible to contest the leadership must be an Alliance MP, 
MLA or MEP and, with the exception of the current party leader, must have their candidacy 
endorsed by 12 members of the delegate conference. Selection is conducted by secret ballot 
using STV. In terms of deselection, Alliance does not set a maximum tenure limit for 
leadership. However, the provision for an annual election does see an incumbent elected for a 
short fixed term. The provision of an annual election – a feature not commonly found in other 
Western political parties (Cross and Blais, 2012) – was presented by those within Alliance as 
an important means of protecting against ‘an autocratic leadership’: 
 
Once somebody becomes leader nobody needs to lead a charge against them 
or there doesn’t have to be some ‘Night of the Long Knives’ caper to get rid 
of them. They are very easily removed if people want to do that.53 
 
A special meeting to deselect a leader can also be held upon request by 25 members of ‘The 
Council’ or if the Executive Committee so decides.  
 The selectorate used by Alliance has become more inclusive over time.54 The current 
delegate franchise was introduced in 1998 following 28 years of selection by the party’s 
elected representatives. The four leaders of Alliance in the period 1970-98 owed their 
positions to a determination from the party’s elected representatives. Following its 
establishment in 1970 the Alliance Party initially rejected the notion of having a ‘Party 
Leader’ per se, opting for a ‘collective leadership’ approach.55 As a result the party opted for 
a joint leadership of Phelim O’Neill and Bob Cooper in its first two years and possessed no 
formal rules on selection. Once the party had moved to a more secure organisational footing, 
Oliver Napier emerged as its sole leader in 1972.56 Selection by the party’s elected 
representatives was formally enshrined in 1976, with the party leader identified as ‘the leader 
of the Assembly Party’ and would remain party practice until 1998, with both John 
Cushnahan (1984-87) and John Alderdice (1987-98) elected by their peers.57 Some evidence 
of agitation from the rank-and-file membership for a more inclusive selectorate can be 
identified in this period. In 1994 a motion calling for a delegate system in place of selection 
by the party’s elected representatives was defeated at conference.58 Four years later this 
reform would come to pass, with the party adopting its current selectorate. Such reform was 
introduced following the election of Séan Neeson as leader in 1998. Neeson replaced John 
Alderdice who was forced to resign his leadership following his decision to sit as Speaker in 
the new Northern Ireland Assembly, a move which meant that he no longer satisfied the 
candidacy requirements for leadership.59 In light of past calls for reform, the election of 
Neeson by a small grouping of parliamentary representatives was deemed too exclusive a 
                                                          
52 This conference consists of: 10 Party Officers; 12 members of the Executive Committee; all Alliance Party 
elected representatives; up to 5 Vice-Presidents; 10 delegates from the party youth wing; and 10 delegates per 
Constituency Association (APNI, 2013a: Clause 5). 
53 APNI 3 (2013, May) Interview with the author 
54 APNI (1971) Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Constitution and Rules; (1994) Alliance Party of Northern 
Ireland Constitution and Rules; (1999) Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Constitution and Rules 
55 APNI (1970) ‘Alliance Moves into Top Gear: First Party Council to elect leadership’ Alliance Bulletin, 20 
October 
56 APNI 2 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
57 APNI (1976) ‘Extract of Constitutional Amendments passed at AGM of Council’ 
58 APNI (1994) ‘Proposed revisions to: The Alliance Party of NI Constitution and Rules’ 
59 The party leader was required to be a member of the party’s Assembly group.  
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process and necessitated a constitutional amendment.60 Alliance’s direction of travel in terms 
of leadership selection, therefore, bears comparison with that undertaken by the SDLP and, to 
a lesser extent, the UUP. It represents yet another example from the Northern Irish case of a 
party replacing selection by a parliamentary caucus with a more inclusive selectorate. 
 As with the SDLP, Alliance’s adoption of a more inclusive selectorate for leadership 
contests should be viewed alongside its retention of exclusive candidacy requirements. Prior 
to 2010 the party restricted candidacy to those in its Assembly grouping and, as demonstrated 
in the case of John Alderdice, this formal rule held in practice. However, with the election of 
deputy leader, Naomi Long, to Westminster in 2010 – ‘an eventuality we hadn’t planned 
for’61 – the party widened this grouping to include both MPs and MEPs to ensure that she 
retained her leadership role.62 Such expedience did not of course alter the principle of 
exclusive candidacy. The exclusive nature of the party’s candidacy requirements is almost 
certainly a reflection of a wider norm in parliamentary democracies that the party leader will 
emerge from those residing in the party room (Cross and Blais, 2012: 78-79). Alliance (along 
with the SDLP) has adopted a feature of parties found elsewhere, not least Britain and 
Ireland.63 As with the SDLP and DUP we can surmise that the restriction of candidacy to the 
parliamentary party (and MLAs more specifically) has certain implications for the internal 
balance of power within Alliance. This is the site from which a challenge to the leadership 
will develop and it is this body which can exert the greatest tangible influence on the act of 
removing a leader. For example, the resignation of Neeson in 2001 followed internal 
criticism (including the resignation of his deputy, Seamus Close) over the party’s poor 
electoral showings in the 1999 European and 2001 Westminster and local government 
elections; such criticism would most likely have manifested itself in a direct challenge from 
one of his peers in the Assembly group.64 The parliamentary party is, therefore, the most 
important grouping in the removal of an Alliance leader. 
 
 
4. Summary 
 
This study has provided an original empirical analysis of leadership selection in 
Northern Ireland. In doing so, it sheds light on an important element of intra-party democracy 
and goes some way to addressing the clear gap in existing research on party organisation in 
the region. From a comparative perspective it also represents a rare study of leadership 
selection methods in a consociational democracy. The twin objectives of this study were to 
lay bare the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how Northern Ireland’s main parties select their leaders and 
grasp the extent to which such methods have changed – or more specifically been 
‘democratised’ – over time. To this end, a number of key findings present themselves. 
 Firstly, we find a considerable degree of heterogeneity in terms of the selectorate 
adopted by Northern Ireland’s main parties. Two parties occupy the extreme ends of our 
inclusivity continuum, with the DUP concentrating decision-making authority in the hands of 
its parliamentary party and the UUP enfranchising its entire membership. The three 
                                                          
60 APNI 1 (2013, April) Interview with the author 
61 APNI 5 (2013, May) Interview with the author 
62 APNI (2010) Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Constitution and Rules 
63 In the Irish case both Fine Gael and the Labour Party restrict candidacy to members of Dáil Éireann. In Britain 
both Labour and the Liberal Democrats adopt formal rules restricting candidacy to members of parliament. 
64 APNI 6 (2013, March) Interview with the author; APNI 4 (2013, June) Interview with the author 
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remaining parties – Sinn Féin, Alliance and the SDLP – leave selection to a delegate 
convention (albeit with varying degrees of representation afforded to regional, local and 
affiliated bodies). For comparative scholars, the most exceptional process would be that 
adopted by the DUP. The party is conspicuous in its retention of a selectorate which is now 
widely regarded as ‘undemocratic’ in the contemporary age (see Cross, 2013). Research 
across a wide range of party systems shows that a shrinking minority of parties formally 
restrict the franchise to the small elite grouping of the parliamentary party (Pilet and Cross, 
2014: 227; Cross and Blais, 2012). The party also constitutes something of an anomaly when 
we consider the ‘participatory revolution’ which has affected virtually all of the main parties 
in both Britain and Ireland. Furthermore, the other main parties in Northern Ireland adopt (or 
have recently adopted) more inclusive methods of selection (see below). How long the party 
can rail against this pervasive trend remains to be seen. As one DUP respondent pondered: 
‘the more the party modernizes is that going to be acceptable to the vast majority of the 
membership over the next five, ten years?’65 Perhaps tellingly, comparative research finds 
that parties which outlast a founding (typically omnipotent) leader, such as the DUP, are 
eventually likely to ‘democratise’ and formalise participation of a larger selectorate (Cross, 
2013: 103). Time, it seems, could eventually tell when it comes to the DUP’s approach to 
leadership selection. 
 The degree of democratisation which has occurred in Northern Ireland in respect of 
leadership selection is quite considerable. The trend towards more inclusive selectorates that 
has taken hold in many other parliamentary democracies has clearly materialised in the 
region. With the exception of Sinn Féin, the initial starting point for parties was selection by 
the parliamentary party. Three of the five parties (SDLP, Alliance, and UUP) have, however, 
moved to adopt more inclusive selectorates over the course of their lifetime. Indeed, as 
argued, the UUP represents a quintessential example of a party evolving from an oligarchic 
method to one involving a full member vote. On this point, however, there has, been nothing 
in the way of ‘organisational contagion’ in Northern Ireland. The UUP’s decision to 
introduce ‘OMOV’ in 2007 has exerted negligible pressure on the other main parties to 
(further) ‘democratise’ their own procedures. 
 One remarkable finding of the study is that all five parties in Northern Ireland adopt a 
fixed term for their leadership. Long-standing practice sees each party leader subject to an 
annual process of selection (or ratification). On this point the region’s parties prove rather 
exceptional when compared with other cases. Cross and Blais’ (2012: 177-9) study of 22 
parties in four parliamentary democracies found that, ‘in most parties neither voters nor 
leaders know how long the leadership mandate is’. A more recent comparative study also 
found that a one-year term is only adopted by 1.4% of the 71 parties surveyed (Pilet and 
Cross, 2014: 230). Leadership selection in Northern Ireland, therefore, possesses a feature not 
typically found in party systems elsewhere. Incidentally, the requirement that party leaders 
face annual re-election is a feature advocated by party scholars, as it is consistent with 
democratic norms at the system-level (Cross and Blais, 2012: 180).   
 Although Northern Irish party leaders may be subject to a process of annual 
endorsement, challengers to their position typically face high candidacy thresholds. Exclusive 
candidacy requirements are, with the exception of Sinn Féin, the norm in Northern Ireland. In 
some ways this could serve to counterbalance the requirement that party leaders face regular 
re-election. Three parties (DUP, UUP and Sinn Féin) set party membership as the sole 
                                                          
65 DUP 2 (2013, May) Interview with the author 
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candidacy requirement. Interestingly, the remaining two parties, Alliance and the SDLP, 
restrict candidacy to those in the parliamentary party. Again, comparative research of 
leadership selection shows this latter stipulation to be fairly exceptional: five of the 71 parties 
surveyed in Pilet and Cross’s study adopt such a rule (2014: 230). As highlighted, Alliance 
and the SDLP’s moves to adopt more inclusive selectorates in the 1990s should be viewed 
alongside their retention of exclusive candidacy requirements. All five of the parties also set a 
minimum threshold for endorsement. With the UUP we find evidence of a party moving to 
adopt a higher threshold for endorsement (and therefore candidacy) when widening the 
franchise. On this point the DUP possesses a feature shared by a tiny minority of parties in 
other cases, with a candidate requiring endorsement from members of the parliamentary party 
(Pilet and Cross, 2014: 230). In contrast, Sinn Féin sets the lowest threshold, with 
endorsement from a single local branch sufficient. Sinn Féin aside, the exclusive candidacy 
and endorsement requirements set by Northern Ireland’s main parties can (theoretically) be 
seen to bolster the security of their leaders’ positions, as they either face a small pool of 
potential challengers or the obstacles a challenger must overcome are considerable. 
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Table 1 Rules organising the selection of party leaders in Northern Ireland  
Party name Candidacy Selectorate Term (in years)  Voting rule Deselection 
DUP Party membership Parliamentary 1 Unspecified Parliamentary  
 and endorsement from  group (MP, MLA  group 
 2 members of & MEP)           
 parliamentary group 
   
UUP Party membership Party members 1 Single Transferable Vote Party members  
 and endorsement from          
 35 members from            
 9 constituency 
 associations  
 
Sinn Féin Party membership Delegates    1 Single Transferable Vote Delegates; 
 and endorsement      extraordinary 
 from one party agency      conference  
       (delegates) 
 
SDLP Member of   Delegates    1 Single Transferable Vote Delegates; 
 Parliamentary group       extraordinary 
 (MP or MLA) and       conference 
 Endorsement from       (delegates) 
 5 local branches 
 
APNI Member of   Delegates    1  Single Transferable Vote Delegates; 
 Parliamentary group       extraordinary 
 (MP or MLA) and       conference 
 endorsement from       (delegates) 
 12 delegates 
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Figure 1 Party leader selection methods: a three dimensional classification 
 
Figure 2 Inclusiveness of the leadership selectorate in Northern Ireland (1905-2014)  
Source: adapted from Pilet and Cross (2014) 
Note: Arrows indicate direction of change and years indicate date of adoption of new 
selectorate 
 
 
 
 
